

Shifting Margins, Shifting Centres: Development Paradigms in Maori Education

Joanna Kidman

He Parekerekere, Victoria University of Wellington (New Zealand)

Abstract

In this paper, the cosmopolitan and imperial underpinnings of New Zealand Maori development education during the late colonial period are explored in relation to current development priorities. It is argued that these philosophies rapidly hybridised in order to fit local economic and political conditions and further, that a form of neo-colonialism subsequently emerged that combines neoliberalism with late colonial thinking about indigenous development. The expression of these ideas by contemporary elites has significant implications for future development education initiatives in New Zealand.

Keywords: Maori education, development education, neoliberalism, late colonialism, indigenous economic development, cultural adaptation, educational policy development

Introduction

Historically, the application of development paradigms and philosophies in indigenous educational communities has had mixed results, although contemporary debates in the field of development education continue to influence aspects of indigenous education policy in small nations such as New Zealand. It is worth noting however, that educational development and provision to indigenous Maori populations in New Zealand owes much to the intersecting local and metropolitan policy narratives of the past where competing notions about the roles of education, culture, and power were played out against a backdrop of tangled Maori-Pakeha relations.¹ Indeed, these particular tensions are a defining characteristic of late colonialism in New Zealand and they continue to be debated today.

In this paper, the cosmopolitan and imperial underpinnings of New Zealand Maori development education during the late colonial period are explored in relation to current development priorities. It is argued that these philosophies rapidly hybrid-

dised in order to fit local economic and political conditions and further, that a form of neo-colonialism has subsequently emerged in the twenty-first century which has significant implications for Maori communities and future development initiatives.

There are three components to this paper. Firstly, cultural adaptation policies developed in the British colonies of West Africa throughout the 1920s are explored in relation to their uptake in New Zealand. These policies were initially adopted by administrators in New Zealand in order to fill the vacuum left behind by earlier cultural assimilation practices that had failed to achieve the political and educational outcomes that Crown officials desired. Cultural adaptation policies formed the basis of later Maori educational development paradigms. Secondly, it is argued that these policies came to be linked to a range of anthropological and educational ideas that emerged from the United States, amongst which the most notable were John Dewey's work on progressive education and Franz Boas' thinking on cultural relativism. In the New Zealand context, the radical potential of Dewey's and Boas' work was acknowledged by many educational administrators and practitioners, but this potential was ultimately captured by more conservative thinkers on Maori development, and a curious interweaving of ideas about progressive education, cultural relativism and cultural adaptation took place in Maori education policy and practice. Thirdly, it is argued that in the twenty-first century the combination of these radically different approaches and philosophies has intersected with neo-liberal thinking about Maori economic development and that there has subsequently been a degree of uptake of market-driven neo-colonial notions of Maori education and development by some Crown and tribal elites.

Cultural Adaptation in the New Zealand Context

Cultural adaptation policies were introduced into Maori education in New Zealand after the First World War at a time when assimilation policies were losing favour amongst government officials.² As it became clear to Crown officials that assimilation practices had failed to deliver the outcomes they desired, new perspectives of cultural contact that developed in other British colonies rose to prominence. In particular, a treatise written by Lord Lugard, a former Governor-General of Nigeria, entitled *Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (1922) was highly influential in New Zealand. Like other colonial administrators of his time, Lugard was concerned about the political actions of indigenous elites who had been educated in British traditions and institutions and were increasingly unwilling to submit to paternalistic colonial rule. Three years after the publication of *Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, he concluded that the inherent fundamental flaw in assimilative education policies 'lay in the failure to recognise that the time must come when this purely intellectual type of education and emancipation of thought would produce its inevitable results, undermining respect for authority, whether of the State or of the parent' (Lugard, 1930:4).

Here, Lugard was commenting on an influential White Paper on British education policy in the colonies, *Education Policy in British Tropical Africa* (1925), which was developed by the Advisory Committee on Native Education in British Tropical Africa. The paper was distributed widely throughout the dominions, including New Zealand, where it was enthusiastically received by administrators of the Maori schooling system. The Advisory Committee drew heavily on both Lugard's educational ideas and the findings of a Commission of Inquiry conducted by the Phelps-Stokes Fund. Under the leadership of American sociologist, Dr. Thomas Jesse Jones, the Commission had earlier produced a report extolling the role of African schools in promoting community development and the importance of relating education to 'the realities of the life of a simple people' (cited in Challiss, 1983:113). The Advisory Committee agreed with Jones' view that rather than foster the development of a western educated native elite which, armed with a university education, had become a 'politically minded' and troublesome group of dissenters, attention should be turned towards delivering a more 'relevant' and 'fitting' education for African children that was geared towards a life of agricultural and manual labour. As Lugard told the Church Missionary Society in a speech in 1925:

'The new policy places in the forefront of educational effort the creation of village schools in close touch with village communities and the mass of people rather than of a small urban class only. It regards education as a means of making both the individual, and the community to which he belongs, more efficient in the sphere of life and the environment in which they are placed, whether it be village arts and crafts, or agriculture, or vocational teaching in more advanced classes. It aims at the training of character and good citizenship, and at inculcating a sense of responsibility and self-control. The teaching of religions is encouraged in order to replace superstitious beliefs, and to assist in the formation of higher standards of life. History and geography, when taught, will have an African and not an English basis, and it is hoped that the result will be to produce leaders of African thought and not imitation white men (Lugard, 1925:160).

Lugard argued that social control could be effectively maintained over large autochthonous populations through a system of indirect rule buttressed by adaptationist policies that were disseminated in large part through the system of education. To that end he advocated the establishment of a series of native governing bodies loosely based on customary forms of tribal organisation. These organisations were to be run by 'native' leaders who would mediate relationships between 'native' groups. Lugard argued:

'[t]he British Empire... has only one mission – for liberty and self-development on no standardised lines, so that all may feel that their interests and religion are safe under the British flag. Such liberty and self-development can be best secured to the native population by leaving them free to manage their own affairs through their own rulers, proportionately to their degree of advancement, under the guidance of British staff, and subject to the laws and policy of the administration (Lugard, 1922:94).

The intent of this argument was not to diminish British colonial administration or replace it with indigenous forms of government; rather, the appropriation of native institutions to serve the needs of settler governments was seen as a means of pro-

protecting British rule in the colonies (Simon, 1998:62). As Mamdani (1999) contends, indirect rule was geared towards confronting indigenous custom analytically, rather than dismissing it dogmatically, and to this end certain aspects of native tradition, especially those that dovetailed with the requirements of the British colonial authorities, were sanctioned (1999:865). In this respect, the official deployment of indigenous processes to deal with 'native' concerns, created a malleable layer of political 'middle management' that supported the colonial administration of the colonies. However, as Simon and Smith (2001) argue in relation to Maori education, indirect rule also involved the delegation of a measure of authority to tribal elites who were prepared to cooperate with colonial administrations 'in return for personal privileges' (2001:317). In other words, indirect rule, and its enactment in New Zealand, was favourably perceived by some Crown officials as a form of clientelism, and within this model of development the role of education was important.

By the 1920s, these debates were gaining ground in New Zealand where the economy was heavily dependent on agriculture and timber exports to Britain. In the rapidly urbanising environment of the early twentieth century, the success of the New Zealand economy rested on maintaining a pool of willing agricultural and manual labourers who were prepared to remain in rural areas and work the land. At that time many Crown officials and educators expressed a marked preference for Maori to remain as a rural people, and these ideas were closely tied to the economic imperatives of the era. For example, the Reverend M.V. Butterfield, Principal of a Maori boarding school, told a conference of education officials in 1910 that most Maori

'could not bear the strain of higher education. In commerce, the Maori could not hope to compete with the pakeha. In trades, the Maoris were splendid copyists, but not originators. As carpenters they could cope under a capable instructor but not otherwise. Agriculture was the one calling suitable for Maoris, the only difficulty here being the natural aversion of boys to work on the soil. It was therefore necessary to teach them the 'nobility of labour' (cited in Barrington, 2008:162).

Thus, a particular notion of indigenous citizenship took root in New Zealand during the post-assimilation phase of the colonial enterprise – namely that Maori should be encouraged to maintain their indigeneity insofar as it supported a system of indirect rule by Pakeha elites.

The cultural adaptation policies developed in Africa in the 1920s and that were so influential in New Zealand can therefore be seen as an early version of global citizenship in an evolving world economy. The education officials who translated these ideas into policy were undoubtedly concerned about the role of Maori in New Zealand society and were seeking answers for a range of complex questions about indigeneity and the notion of citizenship in a declining global empire. However, their ideas about citizenship were closely tied to their allegiances to the governmental and economic systems of late colonialism. Indigeneity, and its embodiment by Maori, they saw as being admirable, so long as it fitted with, and complemented,

a Westminster rule of law. In this respect, indirect rule led to the institutionalisation of cultural difference through the use of the education system as a means of neutralising political unrest amongst Maori 'citizens' and maintaining the economic and social order. Cultural difference therefore, was embedded in educational policy in ways that reinforced the prevailing rule of the government of the dominion.

However, other forces in Maori education and cultural adaptation approaches, which were conservative in nature, also soon came to be linked to a range of more progressive ideas about culture and education. The interplay between these different philosophies resulted in a hybridised approach to the administration of Maori education, but it was an approach that was ultimately captured by more conservative educational administrators and practitioners.

Progressive Education and Cultural Relativism

At the same time as cultural adaptation policies were making their way into the administration of Maori education, other educational perspectives had also captured the imagination of teachers in Native Schools. Many were familiar with Dewey's progressive education movement and its emphasis on experiential learning and the integral role of local communities in educational delivery and practice. At the time, Dewey's educational theories were championed by several influential education officials in New Zealand, at least one of whom had studied under Dewey (Barrington, 2008:176). The Inspector of Native Schools, Douglas Ball, was impressed with Dewey's writings and encouraged Native School teachers to ground their work in these ideas, and to that end he initiated a regular column in the *Education Gazette* for the dissemination of new educational theories (Barrington, 2008: 176). Certainly, Dewey's work as well as that of other progressive educators had an impact on Maori education policy and practice, but although the nature and intent of progressive education was entirely distinct from that of cultural adaptation, New Zealand policy makers saw similarities in the way the role of local communities and practical training were perceived. Ideas from different educational paradigms thus began to be coupled and a hybridised policy focus couched in humanitarian phraseology and ideals began to emerge.

Alongside the introduction of educational theories from North America, educational policy makers in New Zealand were also aware of new ideas emerging from the field of anthropology. The work of Franz Boas was slow to gain much ground in New Zealand, but eventually his ideas about cultural relativism were woven into policy and have remained there ever since (Barrington, 2008:174). Boas offered an important counter-argument to anthropologists of the structural-functionalist school, such as Malinowski, who placed western cultures at the pinnacle of human achievement. In contrast, Boas contended that indigenous cultures were fluid, permeable and unbounded and as such they needed to be studied in relation to local contexts and in their own terms, rather than compared with western cultural models and standards.

Boas' argument that there is nothing innately inferior or superior about any culture had a profound influence on a group of Maori politicians and senior public servants who were active during the 1920s. Notable amongst this group were Apirana Ngata, Maui Pomare and Te Rangi Hiroa (also known as Sir Peter Buck), who between them they kept a close watch on theoretical developments overseas (Barrington, 2008: 174; Simon and Smith, 2001:193). As it transpired, Maori proponents of these theories were particularly adept at incorporating the central tenets of cultural relativism into their analyses of educational policy and Maori development. By the 1930s, cultural relativism had found favour amongst many Native School educators and Crown officials and this was in part due to the advocacy of Maori leaders (Simon and Smith, 2001:193; Simon, 1998:69). These ideas were considered radical at the time of their introduction and they provided a clear alternative to the more paternalistic ideas underpinning Lugard's approach to cultural adaptation. However, there were also synergies between certain aspects of cultural adaptation and cultural relativism in terms of educational practice and in the New Zealand policy environment; arguments from one school of thought were frequently used to buttress ideas from the other.

Renato Rosaldo (2000) has commented on some of the more problematic aspects of cultural relativism which are relevant here. He contends that it is unhelpful to confine one's focus to identifying differing cultural world-views in the hope that this will somehow increase understanding between peoples or generate meaningful dialogue. He suggests this stance may ultimately disguise the exercise of power, or enable cultural outsiders to distance themselves from taking action on inequality or injustice. He argues:

'First, the idea of separate but equal cultures no longer seems accurate. Cultures are not separate; they are not confined to their own individual museum cases. They exist side by side in the same space. Also, we've noticed that there are inequalities between cultures – relations of dominance and subordination. Take, for example, settler colonialism, the system we had in America. Relationships formed in the colonial period and after created inequalities, which a committed anthropologist would have to critique' (Rosaldo, 2000).

In New Zealand, Maori and non-Maori peoples share a common but highly contested geopolitical terrain, and cultural meanings and priorities have consequently changed dramatically across time. Moreover, inequalities in the relationships between Maori and Pakeha peoples resulting from the colonial encounter continue to characterise contemporary race relations. Nowhere can this be seen more clearly than in the way in which Maori land claims against the Crown are managed. In the next section, therefore, aspects of Maori-Crown relationships as they are played out in the Waitangi Tribunal – the New Zealand equivalent of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission – are explored and the implications for development education are discussed.

Maori and the Crown: Development Paradigms in the 21st Century

Tribal land claims against the Crown are a central feature of the New Zealand political landscape and a formal mechanism exists for Maori tribes to lodge grievances against the Crown for breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi.³ This mechanism, known as the Waitangi Tribunal, is a permanent Commission of Inquiry invested with the authority to make recommendations to the Crown with regard to settling Maori land claims. While the Waitangi Tribunal was originally envisaged as a state-initiated process for reconciliation between Maori and the Crown in the matter of Maori land grievances, in recent years the process of settling claims has been overlaid with new forms of rhetoric relating to Maori economic and cultural development. The philosophies that underpin these debates can be linked to a revived agenda of indirect rule that has been interwoven with contemporary economic and educational discourses.

The Waitangi Tribunal was established by the Treaty of Waitangi Act on 10 October 1975. It coincided with a period of sustained Maori protest over the loss of tribal land to the Crown and other breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi. Crown officials were alarmed by the prospect of widespread civil unrest and the serious deterioration in race relations that was taking place (see Harris, 2004:70; Belgrave, 2005:80; and Coxhead, 2002). Indeed, these tensions continued to simmer in the following years. Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan, the Member of Parliament for Southern Maori noted, for example, the potentially explosive consequences if the Crown refused to acknowledge Maori Treaty rights and its role in breaching the terms of the Treaty of Waitangi. She said:

'Now we must have effective, equal participation in the rights and responsibilities of citizenship as described in the third article of the treaty, and I dedicate myself to that end. I compliment the Minister on his continuing raft of Bills that recognise that need. If that need is not recognised in our time and age, I am afraid that there will be an explosion in race relations. This Bill, others that have preceded it, and those that are being introduced in tandem with it and being discussed in the House today, will allay that explosive potential. If they do not, I am afraid that not even logic will contain it' (NZPD, 1988b).

Other members of Parliament also saw the need to establish effective state mechanisms to alleviate these tensions. Noel Scott, the Member for Tongariro, during a parliamentary debate on the Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Bill noted that '[t]o leave the issues unresolved is to leave the nation in constant turmoil' (NZPD, 1988a). The Waitangi Tribunal was established during a period when relations between Maori and the Crown were at a particularly low ebb and it was apparent that reconciliation could only take place if state mechanisms were created that focussed on the resolution of breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi and associated Maori land grievances.

The role of the Waitangi Tribunal in the settlement of Maori land claims was originally intended to be a means of facilitating peaceful relations between the

Crown and disaffected Maori groups, and the discourses of reconciliation are embedded in the land claims process today. Indeed, Crown officials are especially eager to portray the contemporary claims process as a means of forging a more peaceful future (Hickey, 2006:114; see also Coxhead, 2002). For example, when a bill for the Treaty settlement to the Ngai Tahu tribes of the South Island was put before Parliament, the Minister in charge of Treaty settlements, Doug Graham, said, '[t]he perfect solution is unobtainable. But in this Bill we have laid a firm foundation for a peaceful and prosperous future' (NZPD, 1998). As the process has evolved, however, a range of other interests have come into play that may be viewed as an extension of indirect rule and the cultural adaptation policies of the past.

Indirect Rule or the Acknowledgment of Tradition?

In the 1920s, New Zealand administrators adopted aspects of Lord Lugard's philosophy of indirect rule through a system of working with native governing bodies loosely based on customary forms of tribal organisation. These policies were eventually combined with other diverse approaches drawn from the progressive education movement and the work of Franz Boas. A similar process of hybridisation took place half a century later when the Waitangi Tribunal was established. By the 1970s, Maori anger over the policies and practices of the Crown in the matter of land alienation began to spill over into civil life and the Crown was called upon to defuse the situation. The establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal was an attempt to resolve historical conflicts between Maori and the Crown, but the peace process that has emerged in recent years owes much to the kinds of ideas that Lugard advocated in the early twentieth century. For example, in the Treaty claims process, the Crown recognises Maori tribes and their leaders as the 'customary' authority through which land claims are negotiated, but it retains the authority to mandate these groups. Effectively, the Crown chooses the groups it shall validate and with whom it shall negotiate financial settlements. This is an apparent acknowledgement of 'traditional' systems of Maori governance insofar as 'traditional' tribal leaders are accorded the status to enter negotiations with Crown officials, in much the same way that colonial agents managed policies of indirect rule through the recognition of 'native' traditional structures and leaders. However, Crown recognition of certain tribal structures, and the refusal to recognise other more contemporary formations of Maori life, treats Maori society as if it is 'frozen in time' as it is assumed that social groupings amongst Maori have not significantly changed since, and as a direct result of, the early colonial encounter (Poata-Smith, 2004:179).

A further problem for several Maori claimant groups has been the Crown's insistence on mandating and negotiating only with the 'customary' tribal groups that it has chosen to recognise, often at the expense of the actual tribal groupings that have emerged. For example, the Crown chooses to enter negotiations with what it calls 'tribes' or *iwi*. *Iwi* are large groupings of kinship-based networks (*hapu*). The *hapu* is a unit of organisation for clusters of smaller groups of extended families

(*whanau*). Traditionally, the hapu (kinship cluster) and the whanau (extended family) have been the primary units of Maori social organisation. However, while the Crown acknowledges this is the customary pattern of Maori social relations, for matters of expediency it prefers to deal with the larger grouping of the iwi and, in more recent years, it has chosen to group diverse iwi within a region together for the purpose of hearing a claim (Birdling, 2004). This policy is laid out as follows:

'The Crown strongly prefers to negotiate settlements with large natural groups of tribal interests, rather than with individual hapu or whanau within a tribe. This makes the process of settlement easier to manage and work through, and helps deal with overlapping interests' (Office of Treaty Settlements, 2002:44).

Tribal groupings are, in effect, viewed by the Crown as geographical and legal entities rather than as autonomous groups with distinctive histories, traditions and cultural protocols. The Office of Treaty Settlements recognises that there are frequently competing claims and disagreements amongst hapu and whanau over matters of representation, but insists that 'unanimity' of diverse claimant interests is a realistic objective for Maori (Poata-Smith, 2004:177). Poata-Smith (2004) argues that the complexity of Maori tribal arrangements and obligations are not fully acknowledged by this process, and the expectation that Maori communities will themselves sort out these problems despite the fact that the issues have emerged as a direct result of Crown protocols relating to mandating is unrealistic. Generally speaking, the Waitangi Tribunal acknowledges the complexity of these arrangements, but the Crown is reluctant to adopt a hapu framework for the settlement of claims, preferring to negotiate directly with iwi rather than hapu or whanau regardless of the fact that smaller groupings are in fact legally entitled to lodge claims. In taking this position, the Crown is 'reviving an old colonial practice of dismissing the intricate patterns of Maori descent and authority as complexities that can be negotiated into non-existence, while at the same time categorising Maori into more convenient groupings' (Poata-Smith, 2004:177). This is particularly problematic because the settlements process gives the Crown an influential role in shaping contemporary Maori identities and tribal futures. Poata-Smith further contends that,

'the evolution of Maori identity needs to be understood as an integral part of a web of social relationships that are themselves subject to change, redefinition and contestation. The shifting nature of identity means that individual Maori can and do represent themselves differently throughout the course of their lives, depending on time, place and context, the audience, and the purpose of the occasion. Yet the Treaty settlement process has entrenched a view of Maori identity that draws on a mythic sense of primordial authenticity and a set of static cultural, social and political assumptions that ignore the dynamism and diversity of contemporary Maori society' (2004:183).

In the Treaty claims environment, the Crown has taken active measures to standardise Maori tribal identity through its mandating process. Within this context, the rich and diverse enactment of cultural and tribal identity and history is placed within judicial constraints and templates. Moreover, since Maori traditional and customary authority is defined within the parameters of state-controlled legal

definitions in the matter of land claims and financial settlements, it is the Crown that validates and defines tribal elites within the claims process and selects who it shall engage in negotiations for financial compensation for the loss of the land. This is a form of indirect rule that closely follows the kinds of ideas that Lugard propounded in the British colonies of Africa during the 1920s, and can also be linked to emerging models of development that attempt to tie these elites to new economic discourses that have come into play in the fields of culture and education.

Economic Development and the Rise of Tribal Corporations

There has been no detailed discussion in New Zealand as to what settlements are meant to achieve for Maori tribal groups or what the intended uses of commercial redress is intended to be used for, and considerable confusion has consequently arisen about the purpose of settlements (Hutton, 2008:6). In recent years, this confusion has created an opening for political elites with a range of neoliberal agendas to enter the fray. That Maori shall use Treaty settlements to fund their own economic development programmes is nowadays portrayed as a matter of inevitability (Sharp, 2004:200-203). For example, the Deputy Leader of the National Party, Gerry Brownlee, in a parliamentary debate prior to his appointment as the Minister for Economic Development in 2008, said of a forthcoming Treaty settlement with the people of Ngati Mutunga:

'There is little doubt that throughout the country where settlement is conferred and accepted, the ongoing economic development that comes from those settlements is of great benefit to the whole of the New Zealand economy' (NZPD, 2006:4500).

In this way, the management of financial compensation for historical injustice is frequently depicted as a moral and economic imperative by political elites who couch the language of Treaty settlements in terms of the public good and the public purse, rather than as a primary means for resolving historical conflict between the Crown and Maori peoples. Thus, a range of economic development agendas and ideologies has begun to frame the process of reconciliation. Alongside these attitudes, Crown perspectives of Maori development have also shifted towards the view that once Treaty settlements have been made, Maori tribal groups shall use their compensation to facilitate entry into global markets. Indeed, Maori are frequently exhorted to act as cultural entrepreneurs in the global market place (Poata-Smith, 2004:168-183). In particular, Treaty settlements are viewed by the Crown as an opportunity to apply free market models to fund future tribal economic development (Seuffert, 2005). Thus, as civic society and culture have become a source of economic investment, some attempts have been made to suture Maori tribal identities into these models of economic development.

There has been a degree of uptake of these ideas amongst some (although not all) tribal elites. These perspectives are, for example, frequently expressed at high-level Maori economic summits, such as Hui Taumata, where some tribal leaders have

argued that cultural identity should be re-packaged in ways that encourage Maori to become competitive entrepreneurs in the global economy. After one such summit, the findings were expressed as follows:

'Managers should be equipped with the best skills and experiences, with greater uptake of international training opportunities, as well as efforts made to bring the world to New Zealand. There was a call for Maori to radically rethink what it means to be Maori, and to work to develop distinctive, innovative products. The Hui called for more cooperation between industries, and the promotion of products in a coordinated way, with greater Maori involvement in trade delegations and missions' (Hui Taumata, 2005).

These approaches have been the subject of intense debate amongst Maori and there has been considerable disquiet amongst some Maori commentators who have expressed concern about the assimilative potential of linking tribal economic development too closely to neoliberal ideologies and free-market economic frameworks. As Hopa (1999) has argued,

In New Zealand, hapu (lineages), not iwi, owned resources and signed the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi, yet tribes have been empowered, on an increasingly corporate basis, by the settler colonial state now comprising Maori claims (1999:103).

Commentators have elsewhere discussed the restructuring of tribal groupings as corporate entities as a direct consequence of Treaty settlements and the implications for tribal identity formation (Sharp, 2004:204; see also Seuffert, 2005: 509, and Poata-Smith, 2004). There is a deep concern that important kin relationships have been partially replaced by legal notions of property, as an amalgamation of business and charitable goals have come to define post-settlement tribal interests. Fears that the corporatisation of iwi in the post-settlement environment may become a form of clientelism have also been expressed by several other commentators (see Sharp, 2004; Seuffert, 2005, and Poata-Smith, 2004). Poata-Smith contends that,

'The corporatisation of iwi has serious implications for governance structures, leadership, representation and accountability within iwi, hapu and urban Maori communities. There is also a growing danger that the restructuring of complex Maori social relations and systems of political authority to fit a settlement model in which business management teams effectively control the collectively held assets of their descendants will ultimately lead to a solidification of Maori descent practices and a restriction of rights to previously accessible land and resources' (2004:181).

Thus, a refashioning of Maori identity is taking place amongst some political and tribal elites that is linked to neoliberal policy discourses and the development models of late colonialism. The problem here is that these particular policy discourses and models do not necessarily serve the development priorities and needs of marginalised Maori groups. Furthermore, these ideas have begun to have an influence on Maori education policy and practice.

Corporatisation and Maori Education

As culture has become a site of economic investment, some tribal corporations have begun to look towards building a presence in the global market. These viewpoints

segue neatly into Crown education policies that play on the importance of ensuring that Maori children are schooled to 'contribute to Aotearoa New Zealand's economic transformation and the communities of which they are a part' (Ministry of Education, 2008:23). These philosophies can be identified in policy statements that exhort schools, Maori communities and industry to work together in ways that weave educational delivery into the economic agenda.⁴ Yet they are also part of a neo-colonial policy regime that is underpinned by the newly entwined ideologies of late colonialism and contemporary neoliberalism that favour the ideals of citizenship and forms of economic and political development of certain elites.

There are implications here for those working in the field of development education, particularly when considering the role of development theories and practices on indigenous populations, and the impact of various kinds of educational dialogues that take place between the North and the South. Development education policy that is fuelled by the ideological rhetoric of political elites does not necessarily represent the aspirations of indigenous people, and it is not always a straightforward matter to identify who, in the changing tribal structures of the Treaty settlement landscape, has the authority, in Maori terms, to speak on matters relating to the collective.

Shifting Margins: Shifting Centres

Development specialists outside New Zealand sometimes suppose that 'dialogues' between Maori and non-Maori about the nature of citizenship do not take place, and that outside help is needed to 'kick start' these conversations. Alternatively, others have assumed that remote regions in the South Pacific offer a *tabula rasa* for the enactment of indigenous community-based development policies or notions of citizenship that have been introduced elsewhere. In fact, there is a high degree of familiarity with development theories and practices formulated in the metropolitan North, and a range of theories and practices have also evolved locally. With regard to the latter, contemporary local practices in New Zealand are significantly shaped by the historical relationships between various interest groups sharing the same geopolitical 'space'. Consequently, the educational policies that have emerged from these relationships speak to the particularised local domain of development, but carry implications for the international sphere of theory and practice.

Within the New Zealand educational policy context and in relation to Maori education a range of policy approaches have come into play over time. In this respect, the 'margins' and 'centres' of policy discourse have oscillated as diverse interests are contested. However, alongside these shifting policy contexts, a degree of synthesis has taken place and these philosophical and ideological combinations drive the contemporary education policy environment. Maori education in twenty-first century New Zealand is framed by these competing cultural, historical, political, and economic interests. Indeed, the frequently volatile dynamics between Maori communities, government officials, educational administrators and teachers have

influenced the way that ideas at the cultural and political 'margins' shift towards the 'centre' (and vice-versa) over a period of time. Further, the historical relationships between these interest groups highlight various instabilities that lie at the 'centre' of government thinking about the nature and purpose of Maori education, particularly with regard to the core policies that govern the delivery of education to indigenous communities.

At present the development education policy discourses of political elites in New Zealand are framed by the ideologies of late colonialism and neoliberal thinking about free-market priorities. But the strategies that have been set in place need to be viewed as part of a larger fabric of policy that is shaped by the historical contexts of the system in which they are enacted. Accordingly, historical perspectives provide a lens for analysing educational thinking in the present; they offer a framework for interrogating popular contemporary notions about what it means to incorporate ideas about culture and indigeneity into the schooling system and how the inclusion of indigenous knowledges in the curriculum might, or might not, shift the margins and the centres of educational thought. Additionally, in taking the long view, we can explore how some of the central themes of development education – empowerment, global and local identities, culture, and justice – have, over time, been incorporated into educational practice in far-flung regions such as New Zealand.

Joanna Kidman is a sociologist of education based in He Parekerekere: The Institute for Research and Development in Maori and Pacific Education, at Victoria University of Wellington in New Zealand. She has tribal affiliations with Te Arawa and Te Aupouri. Email: Joanna.Kidman@vuw.ac.nz

Notes

1 Maori are the indigenous people of New Zealand. The term *Pakeha* refers to people who are not Maori and are usually of European descent.

2 The impact of cultural assimilation policies in New Zealand during the early twentieth century has been extensively researched by educational historians such as John Barrington (2008) and Judith Simon (1998, 2001).

3 The Treaty of Waitangi (1840) is the founding document of modern New Zealand signed by representatives of the British Crown and Maori peoples. In signing the Treaty, the Treaty partners agreed to establish and maintain a relationship of respect and good faith towards each other in all matters concerning the governance of the colony. Maori were recognised as the first peoples (*tangata whenua*) of the land and the right to maintain traditional and customary ways of life was protected under the terms of the Treaty. Since the Treaty was signed there have been numerous occasions when the Crown has failed to act in accordance with the Treaty. The confiscation and alienation of tribal lands has been a particular source of Maori grievance.

4 For example, the Maori Education strategy known as *Ka Hikitea* has the following statement of intent: 'Better collaboration between schools, Maori communities, business, industry, and enterprises can make learning more relevant and support student motivation and engagement as well as career decision-making' (Ministry of Education 2008: 22).

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