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Being an academic: authorship, authenticity and authority

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The author's experience of three common academic activities – the production of a portfolio, the preparation of a CV and the submission of a research assessment report – are related respectively to authorship, authenticity and authority. A comparison is made of how the 'being of' an academic is expressed in these three textual enactments of academic life. The author analyses how his experience illustrates 'the terrors of performativity' (Ball 2003) and he concludes that this illuminates how personal violation parallels our barbarous treatment of the environment and many of the peoples in it; as our education becomes more systematised, more managed, more 'effective' in economic terms, it offers less and less of a barrier to social barbarity.

Keywords: academic identity; authenticity; audit culture; philosophy of education

Introduction

In this article three common academic activities – the production of a portfolio, the preparation of a CV and the submission of a research assessment report – are examined. Each one is related respectively to authorship, authenticity and authority. The purpose of the article is to compare how being an academic is expressed in these three textual enactments of academic life. After some introductory remarks, the author's reflections are presented. This is followed by a discussion that amplifies how the author's experience illustrates 'the terrors of performativity' (Ball 2003).

To claim that one is engaged in education (one's own or that of others) is ineluctably to subscribe to a moral order. The expression of that moral order may be an explicit or subtle statement, or be an ineffable sense of purpose. Whatever its provenance and however it is conceptualised, there is a purpose to education; one does not educate for nothing. Of course, there is no end to the debate over what this purpose is nor, in a healthy society, should there be.

The purposes and practices of education are shot through with inevitable and irresolvable dilemmas, contradictions and paradoxes. No matter how diligently one examines representations, no matter how vigilantly one attends to distinctions between form and substance, no matter how sensitive one is to the distribution and expression of power, one cannot escape compromise, for 'the very possibility of education depends on arriving at some view about how people and societies can and should be represented' (Kemmis 1996, 204). Education, argues Kemmis, involves reading a society, developing texts which organise and express these 'readings' in particular forms, and making those texts available to readers. Whatever forms these readings, texts and readers take, the content, organisation and transmission of these texts are the abiding concerns of curriculum. To put it another way, the authoring and authorising of text is *the* issue

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in education, or, one could claim that the 'representation problem' is the central problem of curriculum (Lundgren 1983, 191).

The power to represent society as is or as desired is differentially distributed. There is the authority to ensure that one's authorship is recognised as the official version, and there is the authority to have one's version recognised as an authentic version. This may be related to a distinction between legality and legitimacy, as was the case in South Africa in the last years of apartheid. In those years, the distinction between the legal position of education serving the interests of the dominant minority class was starkly at odds with education legitimised as liberation. There were official and unofficial texts, textbooks and pamphlets, and of course a great deal of censorship (Ruth and Merkestein 2007). This article proceeds on the assumption that examining the representation of experience in the context of higher education in terms of authorship, authenticity and authority may illuminate how we enact education, especially those enactments that produce texts, and what effect those enactments have on one's sense of self as an academic.

Enactment involves a consideration not only of means and ends but also of form and substance. One aspires, at least, to lack of dissonance, preferably coherence, and ideally a mutual reinforcement between these elements of means, ends, forms and substance. In the educational process both means and ends should be coherent in form and substance. For example, an authoritarian educational practice will not lead to the creation of democratic communities; or, providing formal access to education does not ensure actual or substantive access.

A substantial part of being an academic is to be a producer and consumer of text (knowledge-as-text), to engage in questions of textual authority and to challenge the valorisation of form over substance. In the current condition of education, especially higher education, the role of knowledge, indeed the very idea of knowledge, is unstable. The 'being of' an academic, the texture of the daily life of academics, has been historically formed by what is increasingly considered an unstable material – knowledge. This invites questions of knowledge relative to being. What material is on hand to create the fabric (or fabricate the texture) of my being? Barnett (2004, 71) has pointed out the limits of academic knowledge

> both in its lack of reflexivity and its inability fully to supply the epistemologies that the wider world of fast globalisation requires. More importantly, in such a world – of unpredictability and challengeability – knowledge is being supplanted by *being* as the key term for the university.

Barnett (2004) goes on to ask, in the context of the university, how are we to live personally and collectively with uncertainty, and how are we to understand research and teaching as intentional acts? It is in this context that I would like to raise questions about 'the virtuous dispositions' (Nixon 2004) of being an educator.

One problem is that intentional acts of academia such as teaching and research are increasingly disconnected from one another. We have research audits, and teaching audits, and administrative audits, and individual audits, and institutional audits. This may, from the vantage of the tyranny of economics, be advantageous, for it abets the instrumental assessment of each activity. However, 'research, scholarship and teaching do not simply hang together instrumentally. They are dependent upon and at the same time help sustain a moral framework, the pivotal points of which are truthfulness (accuracy/sincerity), respect (attentiveness/honesty), and authenticity (courage/compassion)' (Nixon 2004, 251).

As explained above, in this exploration three common academic experiences, each of which requires the production of a text, are described and compared. They are the development of a portfolio for a non-competitive teaching fellowship of an educational society, the shaping and presentation of a CV in support of a job application, and the submission of an evidence portfolio for research assessment. I examine how the themes of authorship, authenticity and authority

run through these events and how they all entail forms of representation and function as registers of identity. These three processes and their associated texts are enmeshed with the problem of form and substance. I wish to get at something more than each event separately and touch on the representations of academic practice and the identity of academics. Although playing with metaphor runs the risk of being irritatingly vacuous, it can be a playful provocation as a counterpoint to the 'the endless palaver of performativity' (Nixon 2004, 247) that insists on the illusion of closure. To present something, one may need to re-cover, or dis-cover it in order to re-present it. It may be a text of uncertain texture, a textile that is material or immaterial. The material itself may be reformed or deformed in the process of (re)presentation.

In recent years I have lived and taught in three different countries, and in each of them I have experienced not only 'the [increasing] palaver of performativity' but 'the [increasing] tyranny of economics' (Hendry 2006, 267). It was in this period that I went through the common academic experiences just mentioned, and others such as grant applications, promotion applications, and so on. Each of these processes required a framing of text; that is to say, they involve inclusion and exclusion in the creation of a representation. It began to bear upon me more and more forcibly that each entailed some form of violation, of being forced to 'be' in ways that undermined pivotal points of my well-being as an academic. I was pressed to seek a moral framework in which I could hold onto some sense of being authentic as I authored texts in a world in which authority is dispersed and unstable. What, I had to ask myself, does it mean *to be* an academic? To adjust Barnett's phrase, what are the key terms of my being an academic?

The exploration could be analysed against the analytical framework of neoliberalism, globalism and knowledge capitalism (Olssen and Peters 2005), but the focus here is more modest. Although the experiences all involved offering an account, in each case the agency of assessment and the degree to which the process was felt by me as an audit differed. The assessment of academics in higher education is increasingly entwined with performativity, as suggested above. Claims that regimes of surveillance that lead to performativity are damaging to a person assume there is indeed an academic self, a sense of personhood as an academic, that may be damaged. This is part of that large discussion of the post-modern condition often referenced back to Lyotard (1984) by those who write on the theme of the managed heart (Hochschild 2003) and are critical of recent developments in higher education (Chandler, Barry, and Clark 2002; Coady 2000; Lowrie and Willmott 2006; McInnes 2000). I will be asking how my courage to teach (Palmer 1998) is subject to the terrors of performativity (Ball 2003). Stephen Ball's ideas of fabrications and performativity are especially useful in analysing these experiences. Fabrications (Ball 2000, 2003, 224) are representations of an organisation or person written into existence in performative texts. Truthfulness is not the point. The texts are written in order to be accountable, not to offer direct accounts nor to dissemble. They are part of creating auditable commodities. They lead to performativity, which does not just get in the way of being an academic, but transforms what being an academic is. The analysis offered in this paper of three textual enactments of academia illustrate at a personal level how this transformation works. I am attempting, by reflecting on my experiences, to bring to the fore the inner conflicts, the resistances and the many inauthenticities that I feel inveigled into as an academic under current educational regimes.

The teaching award portfolio: authoring a self

The portfolio has latterly been constructed as a solution to the problems of crude summary assessments and at the same time functions as a response to the supposed quality reform in higher education (Dysthe and Engelsen 2004). Rather than certifying the possession at a particular moment in time of specified skills, abilities and knowledge, the portfolio offers an opportunity

for a candidate to present a range of evidence to support a range of claims. It allows for a flexible and multifaceted approach to assessment. Is there an irony here? Portfolios are not innocent texts; they are of many kinds and fulfil many purposes (Klenowski, Askew, and Carnell 2006).

In this particular instance, the most important feature of this event was its voluntary nature. From start to finish, it was self-motivated. Another important feature was that although the portfolio had to meet certain specifications, there was some creative latitude. Finally, it was a record of achievement, and the reward for doing it was intrinsic.

A teaching portfolio is a highly personal document made relatively public, and as such is a revelation of one's identity. One authors one's own identity, and represents that 'Self'. My motivations were *inter alia* a desire for professional clarity and a desire for recognition. But of course I cannot now let myself off so easily. Why seek professional clarity in *this* particular form and from *this* particular forum? Whence the desire for recognition? To what extent do these desires reflect my seduction by those very aspects of the system which I reject, or at least claim to reject? It is difficult to admit to my desires at all. The only position which seems to have integrity is to acknowledge that one struggles with the contradictions between the espousal of a philosophy and one's enactment of that philosophy, and nevertheless to continue with the struggle.

One of the requirements of the portfolio was a statement of a philosophy of education. My statement made it clear my philosophy of education was substantially informed by the experience of leaving South Africa soon after the Soweto Uprising of 1976. I justified my later return by the realisation that my own liberation would be woven into contributing to the liberation of others, by the realisation that 'The Struggle' was a life-long one for each of us and that education as a political, moral, social, and psychological effort, individual and collective, had a role to play. I claimed that there was something essentially provocative, subversive, and transgressive about education.

To substantiate the story implicit in my philosophy, and to provide evidence of reflective capacity, I recounted in another part of the portfolio pertinent intellectual moments in my career in the form of 'a research story'. This supposedly more factual account (text) also raised the problematic tensions between presentation, reflection on experience and experience itself, and the question '[H]ow is unruly experience transformed into an authoritative written account? How, precisely, is a garrulous, overdetermined cross-cultural encounter shot through with power relations and personal cross-purposes circumscribed as an adequate version?' (Clifford 1988, 25). The story was footnoted indicating my publications relevant to the point being made. Thus, an academic convention was used to make more factual, to buttress, a personal account. In the space of one section of a single text I went from what I believed and felt, to accounting for a narrative. I cannot make the call on this being astute design, clever self-marketing or an indication of insecurity, but I must acknowledge there is a challenge here I have not met.

The development of the portfolio was an act of self-education. It entailed a reflection on experience, it was sense-making, a creative offering, and although difficult, deeply satisfying. As author I was the source of authority. The challenge was to be authentic in the sense of being true to myself. The nature of producing a portfolio encouraged transparency and commitment and inhibited inflated claims. Although it was an examination of a kind, and a representation to others which would be subjected to review, the need to address the criteria of assessment rarely overshadowed the excitement of exploration and the challenges of overcoming the complexities of ethnographic storytelling (Atkinson 1990). Content was valued over method, substance over form, process over structure. Insofar as it was a learning portfolio, it had a liberating effect, it expanded my perspective of professional learning and it activated creative and energising feelings (Klenowski, Askew, and Carnell 2006, 282–3).

At least that is what I claimed in the months after the award. Over time, though, the motivation of intrinsic award began to sound a bit glib. I am now less certain of my ground. I paid a lot of

attention to method, form and structure. Indeed, at times I quite consciously attempted to marry form with substance, process and structure. I also became aware that the creation of a portfolio was a contribution to the creation of an identity. Reflections on the process of producing the portfolio were required to be included in the portfolio. Method became content.

When representing myself in a CV, however, the issue of authenticity in the construction of my identity took on quite a different flavour.

Presenting a CV in support of a job application: authenticity and persuasion

A CV tells the story of the construction of one's identity, and is a representation of that self, presented to persuade. It is a record of choice, which, whilst it may have been, and be, limited, is a substantial part of the process. I have chosen my career, my area of study, and set parameters for place, institution and function. It is commonly accepted that an inquiry into the contents of the course of a life that result in this text called a CV has been consciously shaped to suit a specific audience. The fabrication (cf. Ball 2003 above) is invited and expected. An academic CV may require some research, but it is not a research report; it is a tool of assessment but it is not an examination; it is filled with claims of authorship and authority, but it is not the result of an examined life, it is not a biography or genealogy. Nevertheless *quarere curriculum vitae* gives us a formal text. Although prescriptions are usually fairly standard, some self-expression is expected. Although the process is less personal than developing a portfolio, from the moment I see the post advertised and consider applying, I am in a relationship with an institution and a selection panel. Likewise, the University, with the job description, in its brochures, and on its website, has also set parameters and offers a representation of itself.

In moving from a portfolio to a CV, there is a slight contraction of several dimensions: education becomes less of a philosophy and an enactment of a self and more the possession of specified skills, knowledge and abilities; the focus of attention shifts from context to text; there is a move from the display of and reasonable evidence for, to certification and proof of.

In tracking my feelings as I continued to submit CVs, I noticed patterns. When I felt lacking in confidence, or, conversely, allowed myself to become unrealistically optimistic, I cut out many advertisements. Later, as I reviewed them, I often discarded many of them. I am not sure which came first, a sense of realism that led me to discard them and which led to a sense of confidence, or a sense of confidence that allowed me to be more realistic and then discard them. My sense of well-being and confidence was related to the extent to which I rejected being passive. The act of eventually discarding those advertisements for posts for which I felt I might not after all be an appropriate candidate, or those which for some reason did not appeal to me after all, was an act of confidence, or even self-assertion. One state was a state of desire, and love, a passion for myself, for the work I wanted to do. The other state was one of fear or anxiety; I must, I thought, take all opportunities, no matter how remote, because I could not trust the right situation would come about and if it did not, it would be my fault, because I didn't work hard enough and didn't take every opportunity. I had to get the dance steps right; it doesn't rain if you don't.

When my job search and production of CVs was geared towards assessing how worthwhile I was to others, the process was a source of anxiety, my self-respect waned, and my passion declined. Good CVs and presentations resulted from acting like a competent and confident professional academic and engaging in the academic activities of research and publication, seeking relevant information and appropriately addressing one's audience. Over time the reality was that I fluctuated between self-education and submissive response, and vacillated between both surrendering and claiming authority and authenticity.

However, even though I 'submitted' my CV and application, the nature of the submission and the authority involved was quite different from the experience of fulfilling the requirement for a research assessment.

Fulfilling the requirements for research assessment: submitting to authority

I suggested above that in moving from a portfolio to a CV, there is a contraction of several dimensions. That contraction is advanced when one is required to submit or render an account of 'outputs' according to a pre-specified format. One moves from addressing criteria through to conforming more or less to a widely accepted textual structure, to, quite literally, filling in a form. In an inversion of the usual educational or developmental process, the painter *ends up* painting by numbers. This moment casts its shadow in all directions. The prospect of painting by numbers diminishes the possibility of exploration. If you know that your ultimate painting project will be painting by numbers according to a given layout, why investigate colour and form? There is now no space for story.

Research assessments (RAE in the UK, PBRF in New Zealand, RQF in Australia) are part of the commodification of knowledge in the new economy (Codd 2006). The rationale for them is usually the need for accountability. Here one must insist on the obvious semantic play possible with the word 'account'. One is not being invited to tell a story; one is being instructed to count objects according to a set schema. Even so, accountability in the sense of being responsible is not the issue. Rendel (1988, 85, in Codd 2006, 217) points out that it is the managerialism through which such audits are imposed that is inappropriate, because it 'ignores the complex, specialised and often contradictory nature of the tasks undertaken by academic institutions, and the very considerable conceptual and practical difficulties of measuring and quantifying success'. There is a sense of the very nature of the work as well as the individual being violated. As Nixon (2004), quoted above, observed, the different activities of academic life do not hang together in a purely instrumental way.

I felt this violation. A research assessment exercise requires intellectuals to assess their activities in terms of calculable outcomes set by others. One has to make sure that one is being efficient in specific, pre-established terms. Given the authority, in the sense of coercive power, of the apparatus to which one must respond, and the apparatus's requirement for standardised comparable quantities, one is encouraged to work in terms of the short-term return, to accept the framework, and not question the boundaries; one fills in the form as it is designed. Thus a certain logic or sequencing of questions is enforced at the personal level. The question Who am I?, which could spark off a range of open-ended questions inviting inquiry and discovery such as What is my potential? What can I discover about myself or others? What might be worthwhile? What is needed in the world? What might I contribute?, is transformed into a question of economics. I am reduced from being a source of meaning, productivity, faith, hope, fear, choice, history, and so on, to an investment option, an object of assessment in terms of return on investment tied to a specific time and place. In other words, I am reduced from a person to a commodity. This involves a shift in locus of control and the surrendering of authorship. I now have to ask What is required? How will it rank?; and such questions which lead me to transform Who am I? to Am I economically viable? Now, instead of looking at what I do in the light of questions such as, Is this going to help anyone? Does it contribute anything useful? Is it enjoyable? I must ask, What category does this fit into and how will it rank, how many points do I get? How will I eventually be rated? Colleagues whom I hold in high regard talk less and less about the actual research they do and more and more about the number of outputs they have produced. It is profoundly anti-educational. It does not encourage authenticity, but rather encourages one to push the limits of surviving verification. Only outright tax evasion is illegal; tax avoidance is legitimate.

My intuitive dislike of what research assessment exercises require is regularly refreshed. A workshop facilitator recently explained that the submission of an Evidence Portfolio 'is all about selling yourself'. The degradation is complete. The 'I' or 'self' that embodies the Odysseus in us all, that is the provenance of endless questions, that articulates the call that draws us to the educational vocation, is reduced to an agent, an instrument, a technique that must become part of the apparatus that must act upon itself to reduce that self to a commodity that can be traded in the market place. In a triumph of method over content, form over substance, and structure over process, one … *submits* … *evidence* … to an *authority* … of the *apparatus*.

Discussion

One of the most common areas of disagreement among educational theorists concerns the purpose of education (*Encyclopædia Britannica* 2006). Greene (1995, 20) concludes that 'there is no summing up the themes of what counts as Philosophy of Education', but writes of initiating the young into a conversation whilst bearing in mind 'that the great conversation, like culture itself, becomes subject to transformations by means of critique and reflexivity'. The means of meaningful education comprise critique, reflexivity and conversation. Based on my experience described above, I would argue that the extent to which education is cast in terms of the management of provision and performance is the extent to which it is rendered meaningless.

When developing my teaching portfolio, the dominant emotions were curiosity, thrill, passion, and satisfaction. In searching for a position, I experienced roughly two sets of emotions: desire, passion, love, interest, hope, eagerness, which was light; and boredom, resentment, and frustration, which was muddy and messy and dark. The first was when I was applying for jobs that excited me; the second was when I was applying for jobs that I thought I ought to apply for, irrespective of what I felt. The first condition was one of me being connected to my true desire and passion; the second arose from me trying to please other voices, an effort that emerged from a sense of inadequacy and feeling distracted. The first led to quality results, the second usually to poor quality. Finally, fulfilling the requirements for a research assessment exercise was a frustrating experience, one which, had I taken the injunction to 'sell myself' seriously, could also have been degrading. In this last process, content was swamped by form, at times quite literally by 'the form', which pre-determined not only the shaping of the text, but at times the content. In the interests of the technological apparatus substance expunged content.

Education is marked by love, fear, desire and boredom. What can we say of the tyrannical abusive teacher? Certainly there is passion there, but it is not love. If we pursue this line of thinking, we may argue that a good indicator of an educator's effectiveness is her (or his) own self-reported level of satisfaction, that is to say, her own sense of love and passion for her work. The self-expression involved in portfolios may well be one of the best bases for assessing effectiveness. Educators who report high levels of fear, indifference or frustration are less likely to be effective. This throws an unhealthy glow over the current pressure on educators to record 'objective' measures of achievement or effectiveness. The demands of such pressure distract them from the core passion of their work and provoke frustration and indifference. In other words, the demand for an 'account' destroys exactly that which it purports to measure. One is reminded of the 4900-year-old bristlecone pine tree in Wyoming being cut down by an impatient researcher because his tree corer would not work. The oldest living thing on the planet was killed in order to find out how old it was (Zwicky 1992, in Burrell 1999, 391).

I have mentioned that constructing a CV and seeking a position has interesting features that it seems to share with research and education. As with portfolios, and in terms of research, it is easy to retrospectively give an air of coherence and order to a process that had little to do with how one eventually secured a job. One does not readily concede that months of meticulous

and steady persistence was irrelevant, because, in fact, you secured a job through the chance efforts of a stranger who knew your friend. Somehow, even if at a certain level we knew we were being superstitious, we would like to credit our effort with having some effect, if only along the lines of the adage 'luck is preparation meeting opportunity'. What we really want to claim is that it rained because we did the dance right.

This stands in murky relationship to our desire to produce authentic but authoritative accounts of an academic life, which is to say a life devoted to inquiry and education. We claim to be conducting an orderly job search; what we are actually doing is creating those conditions of order which, we believe, have the highest potential to intersect with an infinite number of unpredictable possibilities to create the condition of 'I' meeting 'it'. Education is similar in that we set up conditions and processes (school, university, workshops, courses – what Postman [1993] would call a technological apparatus) which, we hope, maximise the chance of a favourable outcome ('educatedness') between irrational, infinite, and unpredictable entities, such as complex institutions, teachers, students, location, time, event and so on.

The job search is not an interior exploration that is then presented, but it is a social relational process from the start. It is conducted in the face of conditions that have been set by me and others. Both parties exercise authorship – it is in the interest of both parties to be authentic, and both have authority in the process. Both are in a state of tension between passive and active.

There is a resonance here with students asking 'Is this in the exam?' or exhausted thesis writers saying 'Tell me what to write and I'll write it'. They are asking, What are the dance steps? We may sympathise with the requests even as we deplore them as lacking scholarly attitude, but in fact we create the conditions under which it is not unreasonable to ask them. We have made our traditional educational *systems* work (insofar as they can be said to work) as distinct from creating educated individuals, by provoking fear and anxiety, by manipulating students into performance anxiety. There is a parallel with the increasingly pervasive idea in management that some people should manage the performance of others, something quite different from buying and directing the labour of others. We sometimes acknowledge that performance anxiety can be deleterious, but on the whole, we continue to run our systems on the assumption that 'in the absence of direction and control, little or nothing would be produced, the potential of subordinates would be unfulfilled and the lack of objective information on current progress would exclude the possibility of reviewing their activities' (Willmott 1984, 254). We do it so that as educators, we don't lose control, even while we repeatedly assert that our aim is to create independent, autonomous, educated individuals. There is an incoherence between means and espoused aims. Just as students know they must prepare for an exam, institutions know they are going to be assessed. In both cases the exam or assessment is not a positive contribution to the quality of the condition; it reports on it. Students and institutions do not ensure quality because of an assessment; they ensure that they perform for an assessment.

If we assume that teachers/educators are professionals capable of professional judgement, then surely we should trust them to make professional decisions. The efficacy of my professional judgements is informed by my reflection on my experience not by experience alone, nor by ungrounded speculation. Principles can be learnt and professionalism can be developed, but it is unlikely that they will be developed when one's performance is guided by the fulfilling of abstract criteria developed by others, by responding to the demands of the apparatus. Such demands make a mechanical, controllable, predictable and robotic process out of a tumultuous, infinitely complex human process. I suspect that one of the best assessments of a student's, or a teacher's, or an institution's progress is that entity's own assessment of its progress. Is that not what we look for in higher education – the capacity to give an accurate self-assessment? An authoritative account of one's identity and an authentic representation of it?

Instead we have the pretensions of Enlightenment science; objects and processes are standardised, weighted, aggregated, and arithmetic applied to calculate the sum of the parts. In a weird inversion of the scientific process, what were dependent variables – the outcomes or results of a commitment to scholarship – are reduced to a single entity that now functions as an independent variable – a score from which it is assumed one's commitment to scholarship can be derived. Straining the calculus even further, it is assumed that certain quantities can function as proxies for quality.

Research assessments are part of a larger ideology that claims efficiency as a primary value, expressed for example in the privatisation of many hitherto state functions. In this state, says Marcuse (1978, 142),

> the efficient individual is the one whose performance is an action only insofar as it is the proper reaction to the objective requirements of the apparatus, and his liberty is confined to the selection of the most adequate means for reaching goals which he did not set.

With this in mind, Deming's 1986 claim appears to be most apposite: 'Evaluation of performance, merit rating, or annual review … nourishes short-term performance, annihilates long-term planning, builds fear, demolishes teamwork, nourishes rivalry and politics. It leaves people … bruised, … feeling inferior, even depressed... It is unfair' (102).

Evidence of the deleterious effects of research assessment exercises and performance appraisals in academia (Benshop and Brouns 2003; Bernard 2000; Blackmore 1997; Brett 2000; Lee and Harley 1998; Marginson 2000; Monastersky 2005; Talib 2001; Tawhai, Pihera, and Bruce-Ferguson 2004; Willmott, 2003;) confirm Deming's observations. They disembody and isolate the academic. At stake here is the identity and representation of the apparatus and those who manage it. It is a case of displacing performance anxiety. This is a feature of management. Managers as a class have persuaded themselves of their causal role in substantial production (Willmott 1984). This cannot be proved. However, evidence of performance can be required. Thus, educators end up having to perform in order to assuage the existential anxiety of managers. The tragedy is that educators who merely manage the performance of students in order to secure evidence for their own performance, fail their students; education and educators by definition cannot be subjected to performance management unless education itself is reduced to something akin to widget production.

I have several times referred to the tension between method and content, form and substance, and structure and process. These tensions are the legacy of the Enlightenment, and have been substantially, if polemically, analysed by Saul (1993). However, since my identity, my career in education, and my struggle for authorship, authenticity and authority have been shaped by the oppressive use of education in South Africa, inspired by highly educated products of European universities, I choose to end by recalling the observation of Eli Wiesel, who pointed out that the designers and perpetrators of the Holocaust were the heirs of Kant and Goethe:

> In most respects the Germans were the best educated people on Earth, but their education did not serve as an adequate barrier to barbarity. What was wrong with their education? In Wiesel's words: 'it emphasized theories, instead of values, concepts rather than human beings, abstraction rather than consciousness, answers instead of questions, ideology and efficiency rather than conscience'. (Orr 1991)

The resonances with trends in modern (higher) education are worrying. In discussing the limits of competence in the context of higher education Barnett (1994, 37) examines the situation where 'understanding is replaced by competence; insight is replaced by effectiveness; and rigour of interactive argument is replaced by communication skills'. The new vocabulary of competence ('skills', 'vocationalism', 'outcomes', 'capability', 'enterprise') does not only displace an older

vocabulary of 'understanding', 'critique', 'interdisciplinarity' and 'wisdom', but reshapes our intellectual landscape and makes it difficult to keep in sight what is being lost: 'the capacities lighted upon are those intended to improve economic competitiveness; other kinds of capabilities and virtues that might promote a different kind of society – friendship, altruism, ethical concern, carefulness, generosity and a myriad others are entirely neglected' (Barnett 1994, 45).

As I reflect on my experiences in developing a teaching portfolio, presenting a CV, and submitting a research evidence portfolio, they provide a useful way of understanding the creation and diffusion of knowledge, the fundamental activities of scholarship. My reflections lead me to conclude that what I feel as personal violation – the demands of the apparatus – is parallel to our barbarous treatment of the environment and many of the peoples in it. As our education becomes more systematised, more managed, more 'effective' in economic terms, it offers less and less of a barrier to barbarity.

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