Research article

Procedural justice and (in)equitable participation in climate negotiations

Authors
  • Carola Klöck (Sciences Po)
  • Christian Baatz (Kiel University)
  • Nils Wendler (University of Kiel)

This is version 1 of this article, this is the latest verison of this preprint.

This article is a preprint and is currently undergoing peer review by UCL Open: Environment.

Abstract

Formally, state parties are equal in all UN negotiations. In theory, every state, regardless of its size, economic, or political power, has the same opportunities and rights to participate. Nevertheless, UN negotiations, such as those on climate, are often considered highly unequal in practice. Many states struggle to meaningfully engage in complex and highly technical multilateral negotiations, including because their delegations are smaller. We here examine delegation size in UN climate negotiations through a procedural justice lens. Starting from normative principles of procedural justice, we argue that equitable negotiations demand the capability of all parties to send a sufficient number of delegates – around 15. Using descriptive analysis of data on delegation sizes of recent COPs, we then highlight that many parties in practice send smaller delegations. Based on these results, we suggest two routes for making climate negotiations more equitable: (i) providing additional resources to poor states to increase their delegation size; and (ii) trimming the overall negotiation agenda to lower the sufficiency threshold. 

Keywords: Climate Negotiation, Climate Justice, Delegation Size, Procedural Justice, UNFCCC

Funding

  • Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (grant 01UU2001)
Preprint Under Review

 Open peer review from Kilian dr Ridder

Review
Dear Authors,

Thank you for your valuable work. You convincingly argue that small delegation sizes are a key problem for procedurally just negotiations in the UNFCCC framework. I do think your article fits well within the scope of the journal. I shall limit my main remarks mostly to part 3, “Procedural justice in the climate negotations”, as my relevant expertise is limited to this. I will add some minor remarks after that. Most of my remarks are meant as mere suggestions, as in my view the paper does not have any major deficits.

Remarks on chapter 3

(1) You might want to consider elaborating more on why procedural justice is of particular relevance to climate negotiations. You have referred to Luke Tomlinson a couple of times, and I think he is a very good starting point. A key difficulty in these massive COP negotiations is that parties are often unable to agree to what is a good and just outcome. Different countries and peoples may have different but still reasonable conceptions of what a just outcome looks like. Tomlinson (2015) uses the term of “reasonable disagreement” to describe this situation. The same term is used in (Brandstedt and Brülde, 2019), a paper which should be of interest to you, I will refer to this below. Both Brandstedt and Tomlinson then make the point that adhering to principles of procedural justice is not only important because this kind of justice is morally relevant in itself. It is also instrumentally valuable, in that parties might be more willing to agree to an outcome once a just decision procedure has been followed. The phenomenon of reasonable disagreement is very prevalent in the UNFCCC, hence the heightened instrumental value of procedural justice.
(2) You may want to consider using a somewhat more elaborate or detailed version of procedural justice and further develop your notion of participation. You have already referenced (Grasso and Sacchi, 2015), who do an excellent job of providing a detailed list of elements of procedural justice: Voice, Information, Transparency, Correctability, Respect, Consistency. Another comprehensive notion of procedural climate justice can be found in (Brandstedt and Brülde, 2019), who mention accuracy, transparency, correctability, participation.
a. In chapter 3, you could mention that transparency is an important element of procedural justice. This would make your case for limiting delegation sizes / COP sizes stronger in part 5. I found it one of the most interesting points in your paper, the idea to limit COP sizes, as that might really help increase transparency. I do think that oversized COPs can harm negotiations. You could strengthen this point by making the norm of transparency an explicit part of your notion of procedural justice
b. You might want to differentiate between participation in the process of choice and voice as the option to voice your concerns. These are two different things and can be separate norms, so it should be clear which of the two you are talking about.
c. As to your paragraph on equal versus sufficient opportunity to influence decisions: this is indeed a tricky topic. I want to bring your attention to a passage in (Tomlinson, 2015), where he dwells on what constitutes a good criterion for who should be allowed to have a say in a decision. This is in his chapter 4, “Getting a seat at the table”. He claims that if you were to try to include all who are affected by a decision, this might prove infeasible. But, he continues, you should definitely include all those potentially coerced by a decision, that is, you should include those actors that may have their autonomy affected or violated by a decision. Back to your passage on sufficient opportunity: this coercion / autonomy criterion might be a way in which you could operationalize what constitutes “sufficient opportunity” to influence decisions.
d. Given the above-mentioned elaborate conceptions of procedural justice, you might want to make more explicit that participation is but one of multiple elements of procedural justice. Then you could either give reasons for why you focus on participation or include other principles (voice, transparency, accuracy) … For another notion of procedural climate justice with multiple distinct elements you can also consider looking at my own work on procedural climate justice, (De Ridder et al., 2023). It goes without saying that I do not demand that you consider this, it might just be an interesting read and help you in further developing your notion of procedural justice.

Other remarks
• Do you have data on the compositions of delegations? It would be helpful to know what fraction of delegates actually negotiates / participates in discussions and what fraction is just there for logistical / other purposes
• The graphs need some work
o I find the line in figure 1 somewhat misleading, as it looks like a process / development over time, where it is not that. Maybe use points / markers instead of the line to display the averages.
o For figure 3A, to actually find a relationship between income and average delegation size it might be more appropriate to use not a categorical x-axis but (log) income values on the x axis, then display the actual data points and add a simple regression line. Same applies to 3B, just with the actual population size as x values
• As to your last sentences “As such, the negotiations fail to adequately represent all citizens and stakeholders. Indigenous peoples, future generations, or non-humans are marginalised and un(der)-represented in intra-state climate negotiations. True procedural justice would thus require a reform of the UNFCCC.” This I would phrase somewhat more carefully. These are grand claims and you have spent most of your paper substantiating other claims. You could consider rephrasing the issues to do with indigenous peoples and future generations as further problems for procedural justice to be considered in further research. Moreover, the UNFCCC as such is not the one and only and potentially not even the main governance level / tool to solve climate change. Many issues will need to be solved on a lower governance level, like state or regional or communal levels. I believe that the issues of transparency, participation, voice and so on are very well complemented by a principle of subsidiarity: decisions should be taken on a as low governance level as possible. This could be a suggestion for how to limit the size and scope of COPs: only consider issues on COPs which indeed need global coordination, and delegate other issues to lower governance levels.
• Delete “here” in sentence 3
• On page 9, the required quadrupling of support, where does that number come from?
• Chapter 6, paragraph 2, sentence one: delete “here”. Sentence 2: delete “it” before “providing”


As I have already mentioned above, all these points are to be seen merely as suggestions (except maybe for my points on the figures, as I find the figures do not display optimal empirical practice). I hope there are some points that you find interesting and that offer an improvement to your paper.

Sincerely,
Kilian de Ridder
Vienna, 24th of August 2024.


Brandstedt, E., Brülde, B., 2019. Towards a Theory of Pure Procedural Climate Justice. J Appl Philos 36, 785–799. https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12357
De Ridder, K., Schultz, F.C., Pies, I., 2023. Procedural climate justice: Conceptualizing a polycentric solution to a global problem. Ecological Economics 214, 107998. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2023.107998
Grasso, M., Sacchi, S., 2015. Impure Procedural Justice in Climate Governance Systems. environ values 24, 777–798. https://doi.org/10.3197/096327115X14420732702699
Tomlinson, L., 2015. Procedural Justice in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Negotiating Fairness. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17184-5

Note:
This review refers to round of peer review and may pertain to an earlier version of the document.